Why can't California build more public transit?

S1: Hey , San Diego , I'm Andrew Bowen in for Jade Hindman. Why is it so hard to build public transit in California ? A new report looks at one obstacle you might not have thought of. This is KPBS Midday Edition. Connecting our communities through conversation. California needs better public transit. Trains and buses are critical , not just to our economy. They're also a cornerstone of the fight against climate change. But building better public transit is difficult and expensive in California. And to make it easier , the state needs to get out of its own way. That's the takeaway from a new report by Circulate San Diego called Powerless Brokers Why California Can't Build Transit. Here to explain more is Colin Parent circulate San Diego's CEO and the report's lead author and call him welcome.

S2: Yeah , thanks for having me , Andrew.

S1: There are a lot of things that make it expensive and difficult to build public transit. The labor costs are high. The engineering can often be quite complicated and expensive. Your report focuses on third party permitting. First of all , what does that mean exactly ? And why is it so important for us to pay attention to ? Yeah.

S2: So this is a this is an area of public transit costs that is oftentimes under examined and not thought about. So I think in the public imagination , people can imagine like a public transit agency. They they think about a project , they do the design work , they do the environmental review. They contract with a developer or a construction firm , and then their board of directors votes on the project. And then then they can go ahead and start building that project after all that stuff is completed. But that's actually not how it works. Once they do all of those things , then they have to go into this new , different process called permitting , where they have to get permission from a bunch of different local governments , irrigation districts , public and private utilities to receive permission to to build. And that is. Those are those are the third parties in the permitting process and those transportation authorities , transit authorities have to seek permission from them. And that can be a very difficult , very expensive , very time consuming process that can add not only costs , but also delays and certainly uncertainty.

S1: So what are some examples of permits that a transit agency would actually need in order to build a project ? Yeah.

S2: So like a classic one is a right of way permit. So maybe a transit agency wants to build a across a road that they don't own , or they , they want to cross below or , or above a freeway. That's and those are things that are owned the right of way for that , which means like the ability and the legal right to be able to pass that in that direction is owned by Caltrans , right ? Or on this case of a local road , a local city. And so the Transportation authority will have to seek permission from some , some entity to be able to do that. And , and sometimes those entities have a have a routine process , their supporters of the transit , their supporters of of expanding those kinds of projects and will and will issue those permits in a fairly quick way and in good faith. And sometimes those those third parties are operating in bad faith , and they want to hold up that project either because they don't like it or because they want to use that as leverage to extract something from the transit project , like some ancillary piece of infrastructure or some payment. And those are some of the things that can , can really trip up a project and create problems.

S1: And the bigger that a transit project gets , the more agencies end up having to get involved , and the more opportunity there is for these excessive or arbitrary demands from a third party that may not have an interest in the project getting done. Tell me about the Purple Line subway project in Los Angeles and some of the permitting challenges that it faced. Yeah.

S2: Yeah. So that's a that's a great example of a transit agency , the la metro , who had the political support from the city of Los Angeles , where most of this project was going to happen and still faced a ton of problems on the permitting side from the city of Los Angeles. And so , in particular , what oftentimes would would happen is that the Transportation Authority would propose some some piece of the route , some sort of infrastructure , submit the permit application , and then the engineering designs to the Department of Public Works or the Department of Water and Power. And those city agencies would respond and say , no , no , you have to do it totally differently. You have to completely redesign this at substantially additional cost. And then the transportation agency is just like , okay , I guess we have to do that and , and have to redesign their , their project. And in that one in particular , that's like a multi-billion dollar project. It's going to open later this year is they're expecting and three years before the project was even slated to be finished , they had to they ran out of their contingency budget , and they had to put in another $200 million in that project to pay for all of these surprises that they got from from third parties. And again , this is not an example where where the city of LA , there's no indication that the city of LA is trying to stop the project. Right ? There actually are supporters of the project , but the process of issuing , of applying for and and issuing those permits is just very bureaucratic. It's very indirect , and it's driving a lot of these costs for that agency.

S1: So this report focuses on public transit.

S2: They actually issue the permit themselves. So it's fine , right ? It is also the it may be the case where there's there's some more challenges if like Caltrans wants to build a state highway through , um , through a local government. But in California and this actually true nationwide state transportation departments have , you know , special powers and are able to supersede , uh , these local governments in a lot of ways. What's different about transit is that in a lot of circumstances , not all , but a lot of circumstances. The agency that wants to build the transit is not the agency from whom they have to receive these permits. Right. And so in the San Diego context , oftentimes it's Sandag , our regional transportation agency that's building transit projects. And if they want to do that in in our region , they will oftentimes need to to to seek and receive permits from all kinds of different bodies in government that are not sandag. Maybe they're constituents of sandag , but that's different staff and different decision makers.

S1: California's high speed rail project comes up a lot in this report. I remember voting on the the bonds to start , you know , this this big mega project in California in 2008. I think there was a lot of excitement about it at that time. And since then , it's really become the poster child for California's dysfunction , for its inability to deliver on big infrastructure projects. What are some of the examples of really egregious or unfair permitting challenges that were faced by the High Speed Rail Authority ? Yeah.

S2: So these third party permitting challenges are major issues for high speed rail. And in fact , it was the High speed rail authorities. Office of Inspector General issued a report earlier this year that said third party permitting challenges were the biggest issue facing the agency and facing that project. So this is a this is an enormously important issue for that project. But so what what's happening here is we have this multibillion dollar project that is being run by a state agency that has to go through the rights of way of a whole bunch of different jurisdictions and irrigation districts and all sorts of other things. And in our report , we we detailed some , some examples in in different cities and counties in the central part of California where you had public sector leaders , city managers , and the like being very explicit that what they were going to do is they were going to hold up that project in exchange for money to build infrastructure that they couldn't otherwise afford , things that they were planning , wanted to build , but they didn't have the resources to. And so they were just being extremely I mean , I guess to their credit , transparent about holding this project hostage to , to extract , you know , tens of millions of dollars. And that is just that. And that's something that we as taxpayers here in San Diego are , you know , paying for. Right. And and it's a completely , uh , disjointed process. And the , and the , the high speed rail Authority really just lacks the leverage in those negotiations to get a fair deal. And a lot of these , these cities and counties understand that and are taking it to their advantage.

S1: So a city or a government agency will demand a change to a transit project in exchange for , you know , them agreeing to issue a permit. And that adds time and time adds cost , of course , but the cost can also increase because the construction contract has to change , right ? So explain how change orders work in these transit projects and why that is such an expensive problem. Yeah.

S2: Yeah. So so oftentimes when a big transit project is being is being decided to be built. The transit authority. They don't necessarily build it themselves. Usually they don't. And and so what they do instead is they they issue a request for proposals. They get proposals from construction firms , and they hire a large construction firm to do that project. And a part of that , that contract award is there's a certain price tag. We're going to do these sorts of features. You got to build it according to this. And there's usually a contingency budget because there's an expectation that there's going to be some some surprises. But what change orders are is that when there's when there are enough changes to the scope of the project that that the construction firm has to come back to the board of the Transportation Authority and say , listen , we thought this was going to be a $200 million project , but turns out it's $250 million because there's this new thing that we have to build that you didn't you didn't think you had to build. But turns out that this other third party says we have to. And so now we have to , to , to get more money. And so that is that so , So the total price of that project is , you know , goes up. And I think , relatedly , it's it's difficult for the transit authority to constrain those costs because they're not actually the ones making the decision about those costs. It's some third party who's adding some additional feature or requirement to that , to that project and that. And that results in , in the , you know , transit being more expensive than it otherwise would be , costing the taxpayers and the public agencies more , you know , and sometimes to the benefit of either the third party or the construction firm.

S1: You cite the Blue Line trolley extension here in San Diego as an example of a relatively smooth permitting process. This project opened in 2021. It added nine stations to the Blue Line and took that route up to University City.

S2: Most of the examples in our report were about problematic projects that had a lot of permitting issues and the the mid-coast extension , you know , didn't really not that there were zero , but it was. But compared to others , it was it was pretty smooth sailing and we credited for a couple of reasons. I mean , one is that we have a relatively collegial environment between transportation agencies and governments in the San Diego area. That's due to a lot of reasons , but one one is that we have two transit operators and one county in our region. Whereas in the Bay area , they have nine counties and 27 transit operators. The the county of Los Angeles has also has 27 transit operators , depending on how you count it. And so in San Diego , there's just fewer people to know in that space , fewer decision makers. And so it tends to be it's little easier for people to kind of know each other and to and to work well with each other. Another factor is that , you know , and I think this is sort of related to that because these these folks knew who each other were. They had good working relationships. They were able to plan ahead better. right ? They can kind of imagine or discuss with one another what the likely challenges were for those projects. Kind of work out the details in advance. Before they went to the to hiring a construction firm and picking a price tag on the project. And then and then I think the third biggest component was that Sandag has some authorities under state law , uh , that not every transit authority has. And so , for example , Sandag doesn't need to , to , to follow the zoning or the building code requirements of its , uh , of the jurisdictions in which it's building. It also has the authority to use the right of way of any jurisdiction or public agency within its boundaries. And those powers , plus the good working relationships , meant that when there were some issues that maybe needed to be transcended , uh , instead of having this big , ugly fight , Sandag was able to to try to get resolved in a relatively quick and relatively affordable way. and and that helped the project move forward. Now , now I want to clarify , too , that that project has been in the works for like 20 years. So it's not like it happened like in a blink of an eye. But what what we're talking about here is that after the design was done , after the environmental review was done , after the contract was awarded , then in that permitting process , the project went pretty smoothly. And so that's the that's the part that our reports focused on. And that's just and that's just one of the elements of building transit. But it's an important one that , that and also one where , you know , we can't do much about , uh , you know , interest rates or there's , there's only limited how much funding is available. ET cetera , etc.. And there's only so much we can do with that about that in public policy locally and in California , we absolutely have control over our permitting process. And so those are the areas where we can make the most change and do the most good.

S1: Yeah , those rules are all self-imposed. I can recall riding the Mid-Coast trolley on a media preview ride , and I was chatting with the chief engineer of the project , and I asked her why she thinks it takes so long and cost so much money to build transit. And the first thing that she mentioned was Sequoia. This is the California Environmental Quality Act , and it generally speaking , it requires a government to analyze the environmental impacts of a project that it's building and to mitigate for those impacts. And this can create delays. There can be lawsuits.

S2: And in part , that's because there's been some reforms that have basically said for smart , clean transit projects that meet certain criteria , that have , you know , that generate good jobs and that are , are , are likely to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. They can be exempted from sequel review. And the rationale for this is just that these are projects that are by definition like good for the environment. And so we don't have to have to have them go through the same process as like a nuclear power plant might. Right. And so as a as a result of that , a lot of projects , I think , you know , almost 100 projects in the last few years have transit projects have been exempted from Ceqa school review. And so they're not subject to those kinds of delays and litigation. And so I think that's that's , you know , that's positive. And I'm not saying that we shouldn't , shouldn't have Ceqa for , you know , big scary things that are , you know , have a have an environmental impact. But , you know , an electric bus is not one of those things , like a bicycle lane is not one of those things. And so I think there's really it's really been a diminishing , uh , part. And but I but also I just want to clarify , too , that our report is focused on what happens after Ceqa is done , after environmental review is done. So when we're talking about permitting reform , we're not talking about , you know , changes to Ceqa or or exempting more types of projects or anything like that. We're talking about for the projects that have already gone through environmental review , if they have to do it right. How do we how do we deal with there ? To what extent do we allow those projects to continue going forward ? And so I think I just want to clarify that , because I think it can be kind of a dicey issue for a lot of people if you really. Oh , I really care about sex so much. Okay , great. This is actually not getting in the way of those those sorts of considerations.

S1: The title of your report , Powerless Brokers , is a reference to The Power Broker , which was a seminal biography of Robert Moses. He was an urban planner who built much of New York's highways and bridges. Moses was really notorious for getting projects done fast and with very little regard for public input or democratic checks and balances. Why is the story of Robert Moses relevant here ? Yeah.

S2: I mean , it's relevant for for a number of reasons. I mean , one is that , you know , Robert Moses was. He was this unstoppable , irascible , very problematic figure. But he did get things done right. And he got a bunch of things done , like highways that , like , displaced a lot of people , you know , destroy neighborhoods , you know , really kind of bad stuff. And then fast forward to today , where we have transit authorities that we're trying to empower to do good things like build transit instead of dividing neighborhoods , stitching them back together , but instead of giving them the same kind of powers that we gave to Robert Moses , we're we're we're rendering them effectively powerless. Right. And there's this real stark divide here , notably to Robert Moses famously refused to build transit. Right. And so it's just this strange dynamic that we're trying to do different , better things with public policy. We're trying to to solve some of the problems that were created from these errors in the past. But we're actually not empowering the the public agencies , the transit authorities , to be able to do to do what needs to get done. And so I thought it was we thought it was just kind of a clever way to sort of illustrate that distinction between what had happened in the past and , and , and where we find ourselves today.

S1: We've spent a lot of time diagnosing the problem. What's the solution ? What are your recommendations in this report ? Yeah.

S2: So we have about a third of the report is full is with recommendations. And and and there are a variety of them. But the big component of them are really about how do we assign more responsibility to transit authorities to do the things that we say that we want them to do ? So right now we tell transit authorities , we want you to build transit , but you're actually not allowed to do it , right. And as a result , we don't we don't get as much transit as we we might like , or it's much slower and more expensive. And so so there's a variety of things we can do to , to , to give them the authority to do the things that we say that we want. And so , so a robust reform might be to grant them the ability to issue permits themselves so they don't have to ask for those permissions. And I think that's that might be the right choice , especially for for large and important projects. But there's other stuff that we could do that is maybe a little more modest. So for example , it's a tool that's oftentimes called a shot clock , where you say to to the transit agency they can apply for a permit from a local government , and that local government still gets to decide. They don't , you know , the transit agency doesn't get to self permit , but that but the local government has to make a decision within 60 days. And if they. Yes or no , and if they and if they don't , then the transit agency can move ahead as though they got that that permit. And those are some things that already exist in the law in other contexts. So internationally , in Quebec , that's how transit authorities work. But domestically we use that stuff too. Caltrans actually has to issue rights of way permits now within 60 days when when transit authorities apply. And we've been doing this for over a decade for broadband companies , so broadband companies apply for a permit. This is a federal law. They apply for a permit. Local governments , third party agencies have to make that decision within 60 days.

S1: And the argument that's made in this book called abundance , is essentially that the United States has created too many barriers to building all of the things that we need to survive and thrive in the 21st century. Things like clean energy , housing.

S2: And what we're having now is that we say that we want high speed rail. We say that we want public transit. We even allocate money for it. Like a lot of money. Like there's a lot of money going into high speed rail , but we're not seeing the outcomes that we that we ought to have. And so that abundance for an abundant view of public transit is like , how do we allow for more of the things that we say that we want and get rid of some of the barriers that we've been putting in the way of those things ? And these things , you know , these things don't have to be changes that abandon our commitments to workers rights or environmental review or all of these other things. Those , those , those are really substantive and useful and are trying to advance , you know , important public policy goals. But things like having public works directors of one agency , having a fight with the public works director of another agency , and just like adding $10 million of costs without any sort of substantive benefit to the public or or these other issues , just doesn't make a lot of sense. And so if instead we had clear rules reallocating the authority of the transit authorities themselves , those are sort of things that we can do to allow for more of the things that we say that we want faster and more affordably.

S1:

S2: I believe in climate change. Most of your listeners do. If we're going to be able to do something about that , we're going to have to expand the ability and access for for public transit. That's that's certainly one. But , you know , let's let's talk about something very , very concrete in your term. So the federal government , President Trump , said that he's going to take away federal resources from California's high speed rail project. And their stated reasons is they don't see a path forward to getting that project actually completed. And , and and their reasons for this are , are the reasons that we identify in the report that there are just all kinds of barriers that we have created for doing for doing this. And so I don't think we should take that lying down. I think we ought to prove them wrong. But in order to do that , we're going to have to make some changes about the policies that we that we have in place so that the monies that we do generate locally in our state and also from the federal government are , in fact , being used to build the projects that we say that we want.

S1: I've been speaking with Colin Parent , CEO of Circulate San Diego and lead author of the new report , Powerless Brokers Why California Can't Build Transit. Colin , thanks for joining us.

S2: Yeah , thanks for having me.

S1: And that's our show for today. I'm your host , Andrew Bowen , in for Jade Hindman. Thanks for listening to Midday Edition. Have a great day.